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Abstract?Both   modularity   and   loose-­coupling   properties  
inherent  to  the  self-­adaptive  systems  offer  the  opportunity  for  ad-­
hoc   service   compositions,   dynamic   change   and   adaptation.   To  
provide   such   a   dynamic   and   self-­adapting   behavior,   developers  
emphasize   special   self-­management   policies.   ASSL   (Autonomic  
System   Specification   Language)   is   a   formal   tool   where   such  
policies  might  be  formally  specified,  validated  and  implemented.  
Intrinsically,  the  ASSL-­developed  policies  are  very  strict  and  may  
impose   quite   restrictive   behavior,   which   sometimes   is  
undesirable.   To   solve   the   problem,  we   are   currently   developing  
special   mechanisms   for   ASSL   that   help   to   specify   policies   that  
might   evolve   in   order   to   satisfy   system   goals   changing   in   the  
course  of  system  adaptation.  This  paper  presents  our  work  on  a  
mechanism   imposing   special   loose   self-­management   policies  
introducing  flexibility  into  the  self-­adapting  behavior.  
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I.     INTRODUCTION  
A  self-­adaptive  system  changes  its  behavior  in  response  to  
stimuli  from  its  execution  and  operational  environment  [1].  As  
software   is   used   for  more   pervasive   and   critical   applications,  
support   for   self-­adaptation   is   increasingly   seen   as   vital   in  
avoiding   costly   disruptions   for   repair,   maintenance   and  
evolution  of  systems.  However,   the  wider  use  of  self-­adaptive  
systems   in  a  variety  of  domains  also   leads  to  more  challenges  
in  designing   and   developing   them.   Salehie   and  Tahvildari   [1]  
identify   some   of   these   challenges   including   building   multi-­
property   self-­adaptive   systems   and   deciding   on   adaptive  
processes  in  a  dynamic  and  uncertain  environment.  Any  long-­
running   system   is   subject   to   uncertainty   in   its   execution  
environment  due  to  potential  changes  in  requirements,  business  
conditions,   available   technology,   etc.   Thus,   it   is   important   to  
capture   and   cater   for   uncertainty   as   part   of   the   development  
process.  Failure  to  do  so  may  result  in  systems  that  are  too  rigid  
to   be   fit   for   purpose,   which   is   of   particular   concern   for   the  
domains   that   typically   make   use   of   self-­adaptive   technology.  
We   hypothesize   that   modeling   uncertainty   and   developing  
mechanisms   for   managing   it   as   part   of   software   design   and  
implementation  will  lead  to  systems  that  are:  
?  more  expressive  of  the  real  world;;  
?   fault   tolerant  due   to   fluctuations   in   requirements  and  
conditions  being  anticipated;;    
?   flexible  and  able  to  manage  dynamic  changes.  
Achieving   this   goal   requires   languages   and   notations   that  
are  able  to  model  uncertainty  at  different  stages  of  the  software  
lifecycle  and  tools  that  are  able  to  work  over  these  models  and  
produce   system  code   that   reflects   them.  The  ability   to   specify  
flexible   policies   is   an   important   factor   in   dealing   with  
uncertainty.  For  example,  rather  than  mandating  a  repetition  of  
x   seconds   for   an   operation,   we   may   only   require   that   the  
operation  is  carried  out  as  often  as  possible.  However  it  is  also  
essential   to   identify   properties   that   must   remain   invariant   to  
ensure  correctness  of  system  execution.  
Whittle  et   al.   [2]  have  carried  out   some  work   in  explicitly  
capturing   uncertainty   as   part   of   specifying   system  
requirements.  Our  approach  builds  on  the  ideas  presented  in  [2]  
to  deal  with  uncertainty  throughout  the  development  lifecycle.  
We  extend  ASSL  (Autonomic  System  Specification  Language)  
[3],   a   dedicated   to   Autonomic   Computing   (AC)   [4,   5]  
specification   language   for   self-­adaptive   systems,   with  
constructs   to   capture   and   manage   uncertainty   in   specifying  
system  behavior,  configuration  and  properties.  ASSL  provides  
a  strong  foundation  for  this  work  as  it  has  already  been  used  to  
model   non-­trivial   self-­adaptive   systems   [6,   7,   8]   and   has   an  
established   toolset   including   a   code   generator   and   a   model  
checker.   The   code   generation   tool   for   the   extended   language  
will   be   expanded   to   produce   an   implementation   skeleton,  
which  codifies  the  so-­called  relaxed  properties  of  the  system.  
This  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  We  outline  some  related  
work  in  Section  II.  A  brief  overview  of  the  ASSL  language  is  
provided   in   Section   III   while   the   next   section   describes   the  
extensions  to  the  language  to  capture  uncertainty.  A  case  study  
illustrating   the   extended   ASSL   is   given   in   Section   V.   We  
discuss   our   conclusions   from   this   work   and   provide   some  
thoughts  on  future  work  in  the  final  section.  
II.   RELATED  WORK  
Self-­adaptive  systems  have  inspired  growing  interest  in  the  
formalization   of   such   systems.   In   general,   the   formal  
approaches  help  developers  precisely  describe  with  the  logical  
underpinning  of  mathematics  features  of  a  self-­adaptive  system  
and  validate  those  features  at  a  higher  level  of  abstraction  than  
the   one   provided   by   implementation.   Policy   models,   goal  
models   and   feature   models   are   used   to   specify   possible  
behaviors   of   autonomic   systems   (ASs),   emphasizing   the   self-­
configuration,   self-­healing,   and   self-­optimization   aspects  
present  in  self-­adaptive  systems.  
IBM   Research   has   developed   a   framework   called   Policy  
Management   for   Autonomic   Computing   (PMAC)   [9].   This  
framework   provides   a   standard   model   for   the   definition   of  
policies   and   an   environment   for   the   development   of   software  
objects   that   hold   and   evaluate   policies.   PMAC   is   used   for  
development   and   management   of   intelligent   autonomic  
software   agents.   With   PMAC,   these   agents   incorporate   the  
ability   to  change  dynamically   their  behavior.  This   is  provided  
by   a   formal   specification   of   policies   by   encompassing   the  
scope  under  which  these  policies  are  applicable.  
A   NASA-­developed   formal   approach,   named   R2D2C  
(Requirements  to  Design  to  Code)  is  described  in  [10].  In  this  
approach,   system   designers   may   write   specifications   as  
scenarios  in  constrained  (domain-­specific)  natural  language,  or  
in  a  range  of  other  notations  (including  UML  use  cases).    These  
scenarios  are  then  used  to  derive  a  formal  model  that  fulfills  the  
requirements   stated   at   the   outset,   and   which   is   subsequently  
used  as  a  basis  for  code  generation.    R2D2C  relies  on  a  variety  
of   formal   methods   to   express   the   formal   model   under  
consideration.   The   latter   can   be   used   for   various   types   of  
analysis   and   investigation,   and   as   the   basis   for   fully   formal  
implementations   as   well   as   for   use   in   automated   test   case  
generation.  
Banatre   et   al.   [11]   use   the   chemical   reaction  metaphor   to  
express  the  coordination  of  computations.  In  this  approach  the  
Gama  Formalism   is   used   to  describe  computation   in   terms  of  
chemical   reactions   (described  as   rules)   in   solutions  (described  
as  multi-­sets  of   elements).  When   applied   to  AS   specification,  
the  Gama   Formalism   captures   the   intuition   of   a   collection   of  
cooperative   components   that   evolve   freely   according   to   some  
predefined   constraints   (rules).   System   self-­management   arises  
as   a   result   of   interactions   between   components,   in   the   same  
way  as  "intelligence"  emerges  from  cooperation  in  colonies  of  
biological  agents.  
Whittle   et   al.   [2]   define   a   special   requirements   language  
called  RELAX   that  allows  developers   to   specify   requirements  
that   may   be   relaxed   at   run-­time.   RELAX   helps   to   address  
uncertainty   in   requirements   to   support   self-­adaptive   systems  
development,   in   a   way   such   that   the   uncertainty   can   be  
specified   declaratively   rather   than   by   simply   enumerating   all  
alternative  goals.    
As   mentioned   above,   this   research   builds   on   the   ideas   of  
relaxing  properties  presented  in  [2].  In  this  paper  we  present  an  
extension  of  the  ASSL  language  intended  to  tackle  uncertainty  
in  self-­management  policies  forming  the  self-­adapting  behavior  
of  a  system.  
III.   OVERVIEW  OF  ASSL  
By   its   virtue,   the   Autonomic   System   Specification  
Language  (ASSL)  [3]  provides  both  formal  notation  and  tools  
for   building   software   mechanisms   for   self-­management   in  
complex   systems   where   the   problem   of   formal   specification,  
validation,  and  code  generation  of  autonomic  systems  (ASs)  is  
approached  within  a   framework.  Here,  being  a   formal  method  
dedicated   to   AC,   ASSL   helps   AC   researchers   with   problem  
formation,  system  design,  system  analysis   and  evaluation,   and  
system  implementation.  A  powerful  and  domain-­specific  formal  
notation  is  provided   to  specify  required  features  and  to  model  
high-­level   models   of   ASs   incorporating   those   features.  
Moreover,   suitable   mature   tool   support   is   provided   to   allow  
ASSL  specifications   to  be  edited  and  validated  and  Java  code  
to  be  generated  from  any  valid  specification.  
A.   The  ASSL  Specification  Model  
The  ASSL   formal   notation   [3]   is   based  on   a   specification  
model   exposed   over   hierarchically   organized   formalization  
tiers   (see   Table   1).   The   specification   model   provides   both  
infrastructure   elements   and   mechanisms   needed   by   an   AS.  
Thus,  each  tier  of  the  ASSL  specification  model  is  intended  to  
describe   different   aspects   of   the   AS   in   question,   such   as  
service-­level   objectives,   self-­management   policies,   interaction  
protocols,  events,  actions,  autonomic  elements,  etc.  This  helps  
to  specify  an  AS  at  different  levels  of  abstraction  (imposed  by  
the   ASSL   tiers)   where   the   AS   in   question   is   composed   of  
special   autonomic   elements   (AEs)   interacting   over   special  
interaction  protocols.    
TABLE  I.     ASSL  MULTI-­TIER  SPECIFICATION  MODEL  
AS  
AS  Service-­Level  Objectives  










AE  Service-­Level  Objectives  






AE  Managed  Elements  
AE  Recovery  Protocols  






As  shown  in  Table  1,  the  AS  Tier  specifies  an  AS  in  terms  
of   service-­level   objectives   (SLO),   self-­management   policies,  
architecture   topology,   actions,   events,   and   metrics.   The   AS  
SLO   is   a   high-­level   form   of   behavioral   specification   that  
establishes  system  objectives  such  as  performance.  The  metrics  
constitute   a   set   of   parameters   and  observables  controllable  by  
the   AEs.   At   the   AS   Interaction   Protocol   tier,   the   ASSL  
framework  specifies  an  AS-­level  interaction  protocol  (ASIP),  a  
public   communication   interface,   expressed   with   channels,  
communication   functions   and   messages.   Finally,   at   the   AE  
Tier,  the  ASSL  formal  model  considers  AEs  to  be  analogous  to  
software   agents   able   to  manage   their   own   behavior   and   their  
relationships  with  other  AEs.   In   this   tier,  ASSL  describes   the  
individual  AEs  of  the  AS.  
In   general,   an   ASSL   specification   is   built   around   one   or  
more   self-­management   policies.   This   makes   the   ASSL  
specifications  AC-­driven,  where  ASs  are  modelled  taking  into  
account  the  main  goal  of  AC  -­  self-­management  based  on  four  
main  principles:  self-­configuring,  self-­healing,  self-­optimizing,  
and   self-­protecting   (self-­CHOP).   ASSL   addresses   these   self-­
CHOP   principles   as   self-­management   policies   specified   at  
both   AS   and   AE   tiers.   ASSL   specifies   such   policies   with  
special   constructs   termed   as   fluents   and  mappings.   Whereas  
the   former   are   considered   as   specific   policy   conditions,   the  
latter  map  these  conditions  to  appropriate  actions.  Fluents  are  
expressed  with  fluent-­activating  and  fluent-­terminating  events,  
i.e.,   the   self-­management   policies   are   driven   by   events.   In  
order   to   express   mappings,   conditions   and   actions   are  
considered,   where   the   former   determine   the   latter   in   a  
deterministic   manner.   The   following   ASSL   code   presents   a  
sample  specification  of  a  self-­healing  policy.  
  
  
ASSELF_MANAGEMENT  {    
   SELF_HEALING  {    
      FLUENT  inLosingSpacecraft  {    
         INITIATED_BY  {  EVENTS.spaceCraftLost  }  
         TERMINATED_BY  {  EVENTS.earthNotified  }    
      }    
      MAPPING  {  
         CONDITIONS  {  inLosingSpacecraft    }  
         DO_ACTIONS  {  ACTIONS.notifyEarth  }    
      }  
   }  
}  //  ASSELF_MANAGEMENT  
  
B.   Operational  Evaluation  
The  formal  evaluation  of  the  operational  behavior  of  ASSL  
specification  models   is   a   stepwise   evaluation   of   the   specified  
ASSL   tiers,   where   the   latter   are   evaluated   as   state   transition  
models  in  which  operations  cause  a  current  state  to  evolve  to  a  
new   state   [3].   Thus,   if   we   use   the   convention   for   semantic  
function  in  which  ?  states  for  a  current  state  and  ??  states  for  a  
new  state  then  the  state  evolution  caused  by  an  operation  ??  is  
denoted   as   ?? ????????? ?????????????????? ,   where   the   operation  
?????? ??? ? ? ???   is   an   abstraction   of   a   transition   operation  
performed   by   the   framework   that   potentially   takes   ?  
arguments.  All  the  arguments  are  evaluated  to  their  expression  
value   first,   and   then   the   operation   is   performed.   Here,   in   the  
standard  ASSL  ??  is  a  transition  operation  of  type  ???????(see  
the  set  definition  below).  
????????? ????????????????? ????????? ?????????? ??????????  
?????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ?????? ??????????  
??????????????? ?????? ????????????? ????????? ????????? ??????????  
????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????  
In   addition,   the   operational   semantics   of   the   ASSL   tiers  
introduces  the  notion  of  tier  environment  ?    presenting  the  host  
tier  of   the   sub-­tiers  or  clauses  under  evaluation.  For  example,  
the  AS  Tier  is  a  host  tier  of  the  AS  Actions  sub-­tier  (see  Table  
1).  Thus,  we  write  ? ??    to  mean  that  ?  is  evaluated  in  context  
?  and  ? ?? ? ? ??  to  mean  that,  in  a  given  tier  environment  ?  
(host   tier   for   the   expression  ?)   one   step   of   the   evaluation   of  
expression  ?  in  the  context  ?  results  in  the  expression  ? ?.  Here,  
the   context  ?  is   defined   by   the   tier   content,   i.e.,   sub-­tiers,   tier  
clauses,   etc.   Note   that   the   ASSL   tiers   may   participate   in  
expressions.   For   example,   AS/AE   SLO,   AS/AE   policies,  
fluents,   AS/AE   events,   and  AS/AE  metrics   can   participate   in  
Boolean  expressions,  where  they  are  evaluated  as  true  or  false  
in  the  context  of  their  host  tier  based  on  their  performance.  
1)   ASSL   Self-­management   Policy   Evaluation:  Originally,  
an  ASSL  policy  is  evaluated  over  the  evaluation  of  its  fluents  
and  mappings  and  it   is  closely  related  to  the  events  occurring  
in  the  system.  The  original  operational  evaluation  of  a  fluent  ?  
follows  the  following  algorithm:    
If  an  event  has  occurred  in  the  system  then:      
1.   Process   the   ????????????? ???   clause   to   check   if  
that  event   initiates  the  fluent  ?  and  if  so,   initiate  that  
fluent  with  the  FluentIn()  system  transition  operation:  
?   ???????? ???? ????????? ???????? ????   clauses  
comprising  the  fluent  ?  in  their  ???????????????  
clause.  
?   Evaluate   the  ??????????? ????   clause   and   if   the  
stated   conditions   are   held   then   evaluate   the  
??????????? ????   clause   to   perform   the   actions  
listed  there.      
2.   Process   the  ?????????????? ???   clause   to   check  
if   that   event   terminates   the   fluent   ?   and   if   so,  
terminate   it.   Fluent   termination   is   possible   iff   that  
fluent  has  been  initiated.      
The   semantic   rules   1   through   to   4   present   the   operational  
semantics   that   cope  with   the   algorithm   stated   above.   In   these  
rules,   each   premise   is   a   system   transition   operation   such   as  
?????   (??),   ????????   (?,   ??),   ?????????   (?,   ??),   and  
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4)   ? ??
???????????? ?
??????????????????
?????? ?? ?????????????? ? ???
??????? ?? ? ????? ??????????????????????????????????????
?? ? ??  
  
Here,  ??  is  the  finite  set  of  actions  in  the  context  ?  and  the  
first   premise   in   rule   2   evaluates   whether   the   fluent   ?   is  
initiated,  i.e.,  we  can  terminate  initiated  fluents  only.      
2)   ASSL   Action   Evaluation:   ASSL   actions   comprise   the  
following   tier   clauses:  ??????????? ???,  ???????? ???,  
??????? ???,  ???????? ???,  ????? ???,   ONERR_DOES  
???,  ????????????,  and  ??????????????????  [3].  The  
following   is  an  example  of  ASSL  action  specified  with   some  
of   the   clauses   listed   above.   Note   that   only   the   ????? ????
clause  is  mandatory.  
  
ACTION  doPlanning  {    
   PARAMETERS    {  State  initialState;;  State  goalState;;  TIME  deadline  }  
   GUARDS  {  EVENTS.newAsteroidFoundReceived  }  
   ENSURES  {  EVENTS.planningDone  }  
   DOES  {    
      IF  deadline  >  00:00:00  THEN    
         set  METRICS.teamTaskDeadline.VALUE  =  deadline;;  
         set  METRICS.teamTaskTime.VALUE  =  00:00:00;;  
         apply  AES.ae1.BEHAVIOR_MODELS.modelPlanning  
      END;;  
      instrumentTasks  =  call  IMPL  planTask  (initialState,  goalState,  deadline)    
   }  
   TRIGGERS  {  EVENTS.planningDone  }  
   ONERR_TRIGGERS  {  EVENTS.planningImpossible  }  
}  
  
The  operational  evaluation  of   an  ASSL  action   follows   the  
following  algorithm:  
1.   Map  the  arguments,  if  any,  from  the  action  call  to  the  
parameters  (??????????????  clause).  
2.   Process   the   action   guards,   if   any   (??????? ???  
clause):    
?   If  the  guards  are  held  then  perform  the  action.    
?   Otherwise,  deny  the  action.  
3.   Evaluate  the  variable  declarations,  if  any.  
4.   ?????????????????????????????  
?   If   a   return   statement   is   hit,   then   stop   the   action  
and  return  a  result.    
?   Else,  process  all  the  statements  until  the  end  of  the  
????????  clause.  
5.   ??? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????  
?   If   the  ???????? ???? clause   is   held   then   trigger  
notification  events  via  the  ????????????  clause  
and  exit  the  action  normally.    
?   Else,  process   the  ??????????????  clause  and  
trigger   error   events   via   the   ONERR_TRIGGERS  
???  clause.  
6.   If  an  error  occurs  while  evaluating  the  action  clauses,  
then  stop  the  evaluation  process  and:  
?   Process  the  ??????????????  clause  (similar  to  
the  evaluation  of  the  ????????  clause),  if  any.  
?   Trigger   error   events   via   the  ONERR_TRIGGERS  
???  clause,  if  any.  
  
Note  that  an  ASSL  action  is  evaluated  operationally  when  it  
is  mapped  to  a   fluent  (see  Section  III.B.1)  or  called   internally  
from   another   action   via   a   special   CALL   statement   [3].   For  
example:  
CALL  ACTIONS.checkInstrument;;  
IV.   ASSL  MAY  MECHANISM  
The   standard   ASSL   does   not   provide   specification  
constructs  that  help  developers  specify  policies  evolving  in  the  
course   of   system   adaptation.   Moreover,   the   ASSL   self-­
management   policies   are   very   strict   and   may   impose   quite  
restrictive   behavior,   which   sometimes   leads   to   undesirable  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the  predefined  self-­management  policies.   In   the  course  of   this  
project,   we   have   developed   a   special   ASSL   mechanism   that  
introduces  relaxed  properties  in  the  ASs  developed  with  ASSL.  
?????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????
developers   specify   special   loose   self-­management   policies  
capable  of  flexible  self-­managing  behavior  allowing  ASs  to  be  
more   agile.   Such   loose  policies   introduce   points   of   flexibility  
and   nondeterministic   choice   in   their   behavior.   The   MAY  
Mechanism  is  an  extension  of  ASSL  introducing  a  special  MAY  
specification   modifier   for   ASSL   sub-­tiers.   This   modifier   is  
intended   to   provide   flexibility   and   fault-­tolerance   in   the  
autonomic   behavior   via   the   specification   of   self-­management  
policies,  actions  and  SLO.  
A.   MAY  Self-­management  Policies  
With   the   ASSL   MAY   Mechanism,   the   self-­management  
policies   might   be   specified   at   an   agile   level   of   autonomic  
behavior,   where   an  AS   is   more   flexible   in   terms   of   decision  
making   involving   uncertainty   issues.  A   policy   specified  with  
the  MAY  Mechanism  allows   an  AS   to  decide  on-­the-­fly   if   a  
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????  
A   MAY   policy   is   specified   by   using   the   new   MAY  
?????????????? ????????? ????? ??????????? ???? ????????? ?????????
Note   that   a   self-­management   policy  might   have   one   or  more  
MAY   fluents   coexisting   with   other   non-­MAY   fluents.   The  
following   ASSL   specification   demonstrates   the   specification  
of  the  inLosingSpacecraft  fluent  with  the  MAY  modifier.  
  
  
SELF_HEALING  {    
   MAY  FLUENT  inLosingSpacecraft  {    
      INITIATED_BY  {  EVENTS.spaceCraftLost  }  
      TERMINATED_BY  {  EVENTS.earthNotified  }    
   }    
   MAPPING  {  
      CONDITIONS  {  inLosingSpacecraft    }  
      DO_ACTIONS  {  MAY  ACTIONS.notifyEarth  }    
   }  
}  
  
A   MAY   fluent   requires   MAY   actions   and   is   always  
terminated   after   the   execution   of   its  mapped   actions   even   no  
fluent-­terminating   events   have   occurred   in   the   system.   Thus,  
the  operational  evaluation  of  a  MAY  fluent  ?  adds  a  3-­rd  step  to  
the  fluent  evaluation  (see  Section  III.B.1):  
3.   Silently  terminates  the  fluent  ?  if  it  is  still  active.  
  
The   operational   evaluation   of   a  MAY   fluent   introduces   a  
new   state   transition   operation   (see   Section   3.B)  
termed ???????????? .   The   following   inference   rule  
demonstrates   the   new   behavior   introduced   to   MAY   fluents  












Therefore,   a   MAY   fluent   may   be   terminated   either   in  
normal  way  when  a  fluent-­terminating  event  is  triggered  in  the  
system  or  silently  after  the  mapped  actions  have  been  executed.  
This   gives   the   AS   the   right   to   try   only   one   execution   of   the  
????????? ??????s   even   the   goals   after   their   execution   are   not  
achieved.  
B.   MAY  Actions  
An  ASSL  MAY  action   is   an  ASSL  action  called  with   the  
MAY   modifier   (see   the   example   below).   The   ASSL   MAY  
Mechanism  requires   that   a  MAY  action  performs  as  a  normal  
ASSL  action  (see  the  operational  evaluation  of  ASSL  action  in  
Section   III.B.2)   if   no   exception   is   raised  during   its  execution.  
However,   actions   called   with   the  MAY   modifier   do   not   raise  
exceptions   if   cannot   succeed   and   thus,   they   do   not   trigger  
erroneous   events   even   the   latter   are   specified   in   the  
ONERR_TRIGGER   ????   clause.   Note   though,   that   a   MAY  
action   always   triggers   events   specified   in   the  ON_TRIGGER  
????   clause.   Although   not   defined   as   a   semantic   rule,   to  
comply   with   the  MAY  Mechanism   the  MAY   fluents   shall   be  
mapped  to  MAY  actions.  For  example:    
  
MAPPING  {  
   CONDITIONS  {  inLosingSpacecraft    }  
   DO_ACTIONS  {  MAY  ACTIONS.notifyEarth  }    
}  
  
Note  that  according  to  the  ASSL  Operational  Semantics  [3]  
the  act  of  mapping  an  action  to  a  fluent  requires  that  action  be  
evaluated   operationally   (see   Section   III.B.2).   However,   when  
the   mapping   is   done   with   the   MAY   ????????? ???? ?????????
evaluation  follows  the  following  algorithm:  
1.   Map  the  arguments,  if  any,  from  the  action  call  to  the  
parameters  (??????????????  clause).  
2.   Evaluate  the  variable  declarations,  if  any.  
3.   ?????????????????????????????  
?   If   a   return   statement   is   hit,   then   stop   the   action  
and  return  a  result.    
?   Else,  process  all  the  statements  until  the  end  of  the  
????????  clause.  
?   ??? ???? ????? ???? ??????? ??? ?????????? ???????????
then  trigger  notification  events  via  the  TRIGGERS  
???  clause  and  exit  the  action.    
?   If   an   error   occurs   while   evaluating   the   action  
clauses,   then   stop   the   evaluation   process   and  
process  the  ??????????????  clause  (similar  to  
the  evaluation  of  the  ????????  clause),  if  any.  
  
Therefore,   the   MAY   evaluation   of   an   ASSL   action  
excludes  the  evaluation  of  specified  ??????????,  ENSURES  
???   and   ??????????????? ???   clauses.   Thus,   a   MAY  
action  does  not  raise  erroneous  events,  which  helps  the  system  
handle  uncertainty  without  propagating  erroneous  events  when  
an  action  cannot  be  performed  due  to  problems  in  the  GUARDS  
???,  ???????????  or  ?????????clauses.    
C.   MAY  Service-­level  Objectives  
According   the  ASSL  Operational  Semantics   [3],   an  ASSL  
event   might   be   prompted   by   specified   SLO   (Service-­Level  
Objectives).  This  is  possible  when  an  ASSL  event  is  specified  
with   one   of   the   two   clauses:   ????????? ???   or  
??????????? ???.   Whereas   the   former   specifies   that   the  
event  will  be  prompted  when  specific  SLO  have  degraded  their  
performance,  the  latter  specifies  that  the  event  will  be  prompted  
when   the   SLO   have   normalized   their   performance.   The  
following   rules   evaluate   these   event   clauses   in   a   given   event  


















The  MAY  Mechanism   introduces   SLO   specified  with   the  
MAY  modifier.  For  example:  
  
MAY  SLO  Safety_RiskGroup4  {  
      IF    ASSLO.Safety_RiskGroup1  and    ASSLO.Safety_RiskGroup2  THEN  
          FOREACH    member  in  AES  {    not  member.EVENTS.highRadiationLevel    }      
      END  
}  
  
SLO  defined  as  MAY  do  not  trigger  events  associated  with  
SLO   degradation,   but   do   trigger   events   associated   with   SLO  
normalization.   Note   that   when   encountered   in   expressions,  
SLO   are   evaluated   as  Booleans   based   on   their   performance   -­  
false   if   degraded   and   true   if   not   [3].   The   evaluation   of  MAY  
SLO   is   like   the   evaluation   of   the   regular   SLO.   However,  
degraded  MAY  SLO  are  not  considered  by  the  ?????????????????
control   loop,   which   strives   to   get   the   degraded   regular   SLO  
back  to  normal.  
V.   CASE  STUDY  
To  demonstrate   the  MAY  Mechanism,  we  used  one  of   the  
previously   developed   and   published   ASSL   specification  
models   for   the  NASA  ANTS  (Autonomous  Nano-­Technology  
Swarm)  prospective  mission   [12].  Here,  we  applied   the  MAY  
Mechanism   to   the   ASSL   model   for   Emergent   Self-­Adapting  
Behavior  in  NASA  ANTS  Missions  [13].    
A.   NASA  ANTS    
The   Autonomous   Nano   Technology   Swarm   (ANTS)  
concept  sub-­mission  PAM  (Prospecting  Asteroids  Mission)  is  a  
novel   approach   to   asteroid   belt   resource   exploration.   ANTS  
provides   extremely   high   autonomy,   minimal   communication  
requirements  to  Earth,  and  a  set  of  very  small  explorers  with  a  
few  consumables  [12].  These  explorers  forming  the  swarm  are  
pico-­class,   low-­power,   and   low-­weight   spacecraft   units,   yet  
capable  of  operating  as  fully  autonomous  and  adaptable  agents.  
Figure  1   depicts   the  PAM   (Prospecting  Asteroid  Mission)  
sub-­mission  scenario  of  the  ANTS  concept  mission.  As  shown,  
there   are   three   classes   of   spacecraft:   rulers,   messengers   and  
workers.   By   grouping   them   in   certain   ways,   ANTS   forms  
teams   that   explore  particular  asteroids.  Hence,  ANTS  exhibits  
self-­organization   since   there   is   no   external   force   directing   its  
behavior  and  no  single  spacecraft  unit  has  a  global  view  of  the  
intended  macroscopic  behavior.  The  internal  organization  of  a  
swarm  depends  on  the  global  task  to  be  performed  and  on  the  
current  environmental  conditions.  In  general,  a  swarm  consists  
of  several  sub-­swarms,  which  are  temporal  groups  organized  to  
perform  a  particular  task.  Each  swarm  group  has  a  group  leader  
(ruler),   one   or   more   messengers,   and   a   number   of   workers  
carrying   a   specialized   instrument.  The  messengers   are   needed  




FIGURE  1.  ANTS  MISSION  CONCEPT  [12]    
B.   ASSL  Self-­transformation  Model  for  ANTS    
The  ASSL   specification  model   described   in   [13]   involves  
policies   and   actions   leading   to   operational   transformation   of  
workers.  This  happens  when  a  worker  cannot  perform  its  duties  
anymore,  due  to  a  damage  or  instrument  loss.  If  so,  it    
1.   asks  the  ruler  to  assign  a  new  replacement  worker;;  
2.   strives  to  transform  to  another  category  (messenger  or  
ruler)  useful  to  the  swarm  unit.  
A   worker   may   transform   to   a   ruler   or   a   messenger.  
Moreover,   in   the   case   that   these   transformations   are   not  
possible,  it  may  transform  to  a  stand-­by  ????????????????????????
sails  nearby  and  strives  to  protect  the  replacement  worker  from  
different   hazards.   For   example,   a   shield   unit   could   take   the  
impact  of  an  incoming  small  asteroid  which  is  about  to  hit  the  
replacement  worker.    
The   original   specification   model   [13]   specifies   this   self-­
transformation   behavior   as   a   self-­management   policy   as  
following  (note  that  this  is  a  partial  specification):  
  
AESELF_MANAGEMENT  {  
   OTHER_POLICIES  {  
      SELF_TRANSFORMATION    {  
         FLUENT  unableToExplore    {  
            INITIATED_BY      {  EVENTS.instrIsNonfunctional  }  
            TERMINATED_BY      {    
               EVENTS.canBeRuler  ,  EVENTS.canBeMessenger,    
               EVENTS.canBeShield  ,  EVENTS.mustBeDestroyed    }    
           }  
         FLUENT  inTransformToRuler    {    
            INITIATED_BY      {  EVENTS.canBeRuler  }    
            TERMINATED_BY      {  EVENTS.transformedToRuler  ,    
               EVENTS.canBeMessenger,    EVENTS.canBeShield  }    
         }  
         FLUENT  inTransformToMessenger  {    
            INITIATED_BY      {  EVENTS.canBeMessenger  }  
            TERMINATED_BY      {  EVENTS.transformedToMessenger  ,  
               EVENTS.canBeRuler  ,    EVENTS.canBeShield  }    
         }  
         FLUENT  inTransformToShield  {    
            INITIATED_BY      {    
         EVENTS.canBeShield,  EVENTS.transformedToShield  }    
      TERMINATED_BY      {  EVENTS.mustBeDestroyed    }    
   }  
   FLUENT  inSelfDestruction  {    
      INITIATED_BY      {  EVENTS.mustBeDestroyed  }    
   }  
         MAPPING      {     
            CONDITIONS      {  unableToExplore  }    
            DO_ACTIONS      {  ACTIONS.checkTransformation  }    }  
         MAPPING      {  
            CONDITIONS    {  inTransformToRuler  }    
            DO_ACTIONS      {  ACTIONS.transformToRuler  }    }  
         MAPPING      {     
            CONDITIONS      {  inTransformToMessenger  }    
            DO_ACTIONS      {  ACTIONS.transformToMessenger  }    }  
         MAPPING      {     
            CONDITIONS      {    inTransformToShield  }    
            DO_ACTIONS      {  ACTIONS.transformToShield  }    }  
         MAPPING      {  
            CONDITIONS      {    inSelfDestruction  }    
            DO_ACTIONS      {  ACTIONS.selfDestroy  }    }  
      }    
   }    
}  
  
As  shown,  we  specify  the  self-­transformation  behavior  as  a  
self-­management   policy   specified   at   the   individual   spacecraft  
level  (AE  Tier  ?  see  the  ASSL  multi-­tier  specification  model  in  
Section   III.A).   As   specified,   the   worker   can   make   a   few  
possible   choices   for   transformation   when   is   no   longer  
operational.  To  specify  the  self-­sacrifice  policy  we  used:  
?   SELF-­TRANSFORMATION   ?   a   self-­management   policy  
structure.   We   use   a   set   of   fluents   and   mappings   to  
specify   this   policy.   With   fluents,   we   expressed  
specific   situations,   in   which   the   policy   is   interested,  
and   with   mappings,   we   mapped   those   situations   to  
actions;;  
?   actions  ?  a  set  of  actions  (not  shown  here)  that  can  be  
undertaken   by   the   worker   in   response   to   certain  
conditions,  and  according  to  that  policy;;  
?   events  ?  a   set  of  events   (not   shown  here)   that   initiate  
fluents   and   possibly   are   prompted   by   actions  
according  to  that  policy;;  
?   metrics  ?  a  set  of  metrics  (not  shown  here)  needed  by  
that  policy.        
The   unableToExplore   fluent   takes   place  when   the  worker   is  
no  longer  operational,  due  to  heavy  damage  or  instrument  loss.  
The   fluent   is   initiated   by   an   instrIsNonfunctional   event   and  
terminates   if   one   of   the   events   canBeRuler,   canBeMessenger,  
canBeShield,  or  mustBeDestroyed  occurs.    
Further,   the   unableToExplore   fluent   is   mapped   to   a  
checkTransformation  action  (not  shown  here),  which  checks  for  a  
possible  worker   transformation   and   triggers  one  of   the   events  
that   terminate   the   current   fluent.   Moreover,   each   of   the  
terminating   events   initiates   a   new   fluent   respectively.   The  
?transform?????????????????????????transformTo????????????????
attempt  to  transform  the  worker  into  a  ruler,  a  messenger,  or  a  
shield   respectively.   As   specified,   the   transformation   attempts  
are   hierarchically   related.   Thus,   when   possible,   the  
transformation  process  starts  with  a  transformation  into  ruler  or  
messenger,  and   then,   in  case  of   failure   the  algorithm  attempts  
to   perform   a   transformation   into   shield.   At   the   end   of   the  
hierarchically   ordered   transformations,   we   have   self-­
destruction  of  the  worker,  in  case  none  of  the  transformations  is  
successful.  
The  following  ASSL  code  presents  a  partial  specification  of  
one  of  the  ?transformTo?????????  -­  transformToRuler.  As  shown,  
in  order  to  make   the  transformation  from  worker   to  ruler,   this  
action   changes   the   ??????? service-­level   objectives   (SLO)   ?  
removes   the   old   ones   and   adds   new   ones.   In   addition,   this  
action   re-­specifies   the   unit   in   accordance   with   the   new   SLO  
and  the  new  goals  appropriate  for  a  ruler.  Note  that  some  of  the  
statements   like   the   add   statements   are   not   complete   due   to  
space  limitations.  
  
ACTION  ??????????????????? ?  
   DOES  {    
      call    IMPL  saveAESPEC;;  
      call    ASIP.FUNCTIONS.sendRulerSpecRequest;;    
      call    ASIP.FUNCTIONS.receiveRulerSpecification;;  
//remove  the  old  spec  structures  
      remove    AESLO  {  };;  
      remove    AESELF_MANAGEMENT  {  };;  
               ??  
//produce  the  new  spec  structures  based  on  the  received  spec      
      add    AESLO    ? ???  
      add    AESELF_MANAGEMENT  {  SELF_HEALING  ????????  
            ????  
      call    IMPL  doRulerTransformation  
   }  
   ONERR_DOES    {    call    IMPL  restoreAESPEC    }      
   TRIGGERS    {    EVENTS.transformedToRuler    }  
   ONERR_TRIGGERS      {    
      IF    METRICS.antennaAvailability.VALUE  >  80    THEN    
         EVENTS.canBeMessenger  
      END    ELSE  
         EVENTS.canBeShield  
      END      
   }    
}  
  
As   specified,   the   self-­transformation   policy   is   very  
restrictive   and   cannot   handle   cases   when   the   worker   is  
uncertain   about   the   ongoing   transformation.   To   handle   this  
uncertainty   we   apply   the   MAY   Mechanism   and   specify   the  
fluents   triggering   transformation   with   the  MAY   modifier.   The  
new  SELF_TRANSFORMATION  policy  specification  is  the  following.  
Note  that  this  is  a  partial  specification  emphasizing  the  applied  
MAY  Mechanism.      
  
  AESELF_MANAGEMENT  {  
   OTHER_POLICIES  {  
      SELF_TRANSFORMATION    {  
         FLUENT  unableToExplore    {  ???}  
         MAY  FLUENT  inTransformToRuler    {  ???}  
         MAY  FLUENT  inTransformToMessenger  {  ???}  
         MAY  FLUENT  inTransformToShield  {  ??}  
   MAY  FLUENT  inSelfDestruction  {  ??}  
         MAPPING      {     
            CONDITIONS      {  unableToExplore  }    
            DO_ACTIONS      {  ACTIONS.checkTransformation  }    }  
         MAPPING      {  
            CONDITIONS    {  inTransformToRuler  }    
            DO_ACTIONS      {  MAY  ACTIONS.transformToRuler  }    }  
         MAPPING      {     
            CONDITIONS      {  inTransformToMessenger  }    
            DO_ACTIONS      {  MAY  ACTIONS.transformToMessenger  }    }  
         MAPPING      {     
            CONDITIONS      {    inTransformToShield  }    
            DO_ACTIONS      {  MAY  ACTIONS.transformToShield  }    }  
         MAPPING      {  
            CONDITIONS      {    inSelfDestruction  }    
            DO_ACTIONS      {  MAY  ACTIONS.selfDestroy  }    }  
      }    
   }    
}  
  
With   the   new   specification,   the   worker   will   attempt   a  
transformation   when   the   conditions   require   so,   but   will   not  
continue   trying   to   transform   if   the   conditions   have   changed  
meanwhile   and   the   first   transformation   operation   is   not  
???????????? ???? ??? ??????? ????? ???? ????????? ??????????? has  
stopped  functioning  for  a  while  due  to  a  power  disruption  and  
the  worker  starts  a  ?transformation  to  a  ruler???????????.  Thus,  
the   MAY   inTransformToRuler   fluent   gets   initiated   and   the   MAY  
transformToRuler  action   is   started.  Because   the   fluent   is   specified  
as  a  MAY  fluent  ???????????????????????????? transformToRuler  action  
is   performed   (recall   the   new   operational   evaluation   of   the  
MAY  fluents  ?  see  Section  IV.A).  Therefore,  the  fluent  will  not  
start   the   transformToRuler   action   again   even   the   latter   has   not  
succeeded  with  the  transformation  process.    
Moreover,   because   the   transformToRuler   action   is   called   as   a  
MAY  action   its  operational  evaluation  excludes   the  evaluation  
of   the   otherwise   specified   ??????????????? ????   clause  
(see   Section   IV.B).   Thus,   no   erroneous   events   such   as      
canBeMessenger  or  canBeShield  will  be  fired  and  the  transformation  
process   will   not   be   propagated   to   other   fluents   (e.g.,  
inTransformToMessenger   or   inTransformToShield).   Also,   because   the  
operational   evaluation   of   a  MAY   action  does   not   exclude   the  
evaluation  of  the  ONERR_DOES  ????  clause,  the  latter  will  be  
evaluated   and   the   restoreAESPEC  action  will   be   called   ??? ??????
????? ???? ?????????? ????? ???? ????????????? ????????????????
Therefore,   once   the   worker   is   restored   from   the   unsuccessful  
transformation,   in  order   to  start  a  new  transformation  again,   it  
shall   check   its   instrument   first.   If   the   instrument   is   properly  
functioning  (the  power  is  on  and  the  instrument  is  working)  the  
worker   will   not   initiate   a   transformation.   Instead,   it   will  
continue  operating  as  a  worker.        
VI.   CONCLUSION  AND  FUTURE  WORK  
In   this   paper,  we   have   presented   an   approach   to   handling  
uncertainty  in  self-­adaptive  systems  developed  with  ASSL.  We  
have   introduced   a   new   ASSL   mechanism   (termed   MAY  
Mechanism)   that   helps   developers   specify   special   loose   self-­
management   policies   capable   of   flexible   self-­managing  
behavior  allowing  autonomic  systems  to  be  more  agile  and  not  
so   persistent   in   following   the   specified   behavior.   Such   loose  
policies   introduce   points   of   flexibility   and   nondeterministic  
choice  in  their  behavior.  The  MAY  Mechanism  is  an  extension  
of  ASSL  emphasizing  a  special  MAY  specification  modifier  for  
some  of  the  ASSL  sub-­tiers  such  as  self-­management  policies,  
actions  and  service-­level  objectives.  ASSL  constructs  specified  
with  the  MAY  modifier  are  evaluated  according  the  operational  
semantics  of  the  MAY  mechanism.    
In  this  paper,  we  have  also  presented  a  case  study  where  we  
applied   the  MAY  Mechanism   to   demonstrate   its   applicability  
to   cases   where   the   conditions   determining   the   self-­managing  
behavior  might  change  over  time  and  the  use  of  loose  policies  
is   more   appropriate.   Unfortunately,   it   is   far   easier   to  
demonstrate   validity   of   our   approach   than   to   demonstrate  
conclusively   its   completeness.   In   part,   this   is   because  
completeness   is   at   heart   a   relative   rather   than   an   absolute  
concept.   Therefore,   more   experiments   and   results   are   needed  
and  it   is  our  intention  to  finish  the  code-­generation  part  of  the  
MAY  Mechanism   and   perform   tests  with   the   generated   loose  
policies  under  simulated  conditions.  
Moreover,   we   plan   to   extend   the   MAY  Mechanism   over  
other   ASSL   constructs   such   as  metrics.  Metrics   defined  with  
the   MAY   modifier   shall   be   tolerant   against   threshold-­class  
violations.   Threshold   classes   specify   a   range   of   observable  
values  for  the  ASSL  metrics.  The  ASSL  metrics  are  often  used  
??? ?????? ???? ????????? ???????????? ???ironment   and   thus,   are  
very  sensitive  to  changes.        
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